LEWYN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

6/1/2010 7:17 PM

Character Counts: The “Character of the Government
Action” in Regulatory Takings Actions
∗

Michael Lewyn
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property may not “be taken for public use, without just compen1
sation.” This clause compels the government to compensate a property owner for losses caused by government regulation (often termed
2
“regulatory takings”). For example, the clause is triggered when a
government regulation causes a permanent physical invasion of
3
property or eliminates all economically beneficial uses of such prop4
erty.
But what if the government regulates property in a way that
merely reduces, rather than eliminates, the property’s economic value? Between 1978 and 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States
5
twice addressed this “partial regulatory takings” issue and took a different approach in each case. In 1978, the Court wrote in Penn Cen∗

Associate Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law. I would like to thank Blake
Johnston, my former research assistant, for his valuable help; I would also like to
thank Peter Appel and Jerry Anderson for their valuable comments. Any errors of
fact, law, or logic are mine alone.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (using term “regulatory takings”); DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 320 (5th ed. 2008) (“[R]egulatory takings doctrine . . . [is]
the idea that a police power regulation can, if excessive, be declared by a court to be
a Fifth Amendment taking.”).
3
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
4
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992). Note, however,
that the government may make property economically useless pursuant to “restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already
place upon land ownership.” Id. at 1029.
5
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
326 (2002) (using the term “partial regulatory takings”). Of course, this term is
somewhat misleading, because if the courts hold that a regulation is not sufficiently
intrusive to require compensation of affected landowners, the regulation is technically not a “taking” at all. Nevertheless, I use the term in deference to the Supreme
Court’s shorthand.
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tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York that courts must consider (1)
the economic impact of a regulation upon a property owner, (2) the
effect of such regulation upon the property owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the “character of the govern6
mental action.” But two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the
Court seemingly abandoned this three-pronged approach and ruled
that non-confiscatory zoning creates a taking “if the ordinance does
7
not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”
Until 2005, lower courts often resolved this apparent conflict by
balancing the public interest favoring government regulation against
8
the losses a takings plaintiff incurred because of the regulation.
Courts following this “private harm/public interest” balancing test
held that the “character of the government action” element of Penn
Central required an “inquiry into an assessment of the ‘purpose and
importance of the public interest,’ which then must be weighed
9
against the [property owner’s] loss.” But the Supreme Court’s 2005
10
decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. called this “private
harm/public interest” balancing test into question. In Lingle, the Supreme Court overruled Agins and rejected the application of the
“substantially advance” test in regulatory takings cases. The Court
held that takings cases may not turn solely on whether government
regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest because
such a “formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process,
not a takings, test, and . . . has no proper place in our takings juri11
sprudence.”
Some commentators claim that by overruling Agins, Lingle also
reinterpreted Penn Central as prohibiting lower courts from consider-

6

438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
8
See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 10.6, at 430 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the
“‘character or extent of the government action’ factor has been read by many courts
to open up the inquiry into an assessment of the ‘purpose and importance of the
public interest’ which then must be weighed against the loss”). The “loss” component of this test includes both the “economic impact” and “investment-backed expectations” factors of the Penn Central test. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
9
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.6, at 430; see, e.g., Bass Enters.
Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (using such a standard); see
also infra note 76 (citing examples).
10
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
11
Id. at 540.
7
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12

ing the public benefits of regulation. For example, a land use hornbook reasons that pre-Lingle precedent required an “injection of due
process considerations into the takings equation” by considering the
13
appropriate ends of government action. By resisting such an “injection,” Lingle “eliminates evaluation of the legitimacy of the regulation, and a judicial balancing of interests should follow it to the dust14
Some commentators argue that
bin of Supreme Court errors.”
Lingle actually eliminated the “character of the government action”
15
factor established in Penn Central, while others merely contend that
the “character” factor no longer allows lower courts to weigh the pub16
lic interest favoring government regulation.
This Article disagrees with the assertion that lower courts cannot
consider the public benefits of regulation and argues that, even after
Lingle, courts can and should balance the harm land use regulation
imposes on a takings plaintiff against the weight of the public interest
supporting such regulation. This is so for two reasons. First, the Lingle decision can be harmonized with a “private harm/public interest”
balancing test. Lingle holds that the existence of a valid public purpose standing alone may not justify an otherwise problematic regulation. This rule is perfectly consistent with the proposition that courts
may balance a public purpose against the harm to a takings plaintiff.
Second, the “private harm/public interest” balancing test is easier to apply than alternative interpretations of the Penn Central “character” factor. Commentators who reject the balancing test assert
that the “character” factor should be limited to analysis of whether a
regulation resembles a physical invasion of property and/or the ex17
tent to which a takings plaintiff is singled out for regulation. This
Article suggests that these interpretations are more difficult to apply
18
than the “private harm/public interest” balancing test. To be sure,
the Penn Central test gives judges little guidance regardless of how it is
19
interpreted and should perhaps be overruled. But as long as Penn
12

See infra Part IV.
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.4, at 420.
14
See id. § 10.6, at 430.
15
See infra Part IV.A.
16
See infra Part IV.B.
17
See infra Part V.
18
Id.
19
Cf. Stephen M. Durden, Animal Farm Jurisprudence: Hiding Personal Predilections
Behind the “Plain Language” of the Takings Clause, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 355, 372–74
(2008) (noting the diversity of scholarly opinions as to the proper scope of the Tak13
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Central continues to be good law, balancing public interests and private harms is less incomprehensible and more consistent with Supreme Court precedent than the most popular alternatives. Accordingly, courts should treat the public interest favoring regulation as
part of the “character” factor.
Part II of this Article outlines the history of the regulatory takings doctrine. Part III explains why, as a doctrinal matter, Lingle does
not bar courts from weighing the public interest as part of the “character” factor. Part IV explains why, as a policy matter, courts should
consider the public interest. Finally, Part V shows how courts may intelligibly do so, using a recent case as an example.
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW
Before Penn Central, the Supreme Court rarely addressed regulatory takings issues, although its first major regulatory takings decision
seemingly balanced the economic effects of government regulation
20
against the public interest favoring it. In Penn Central, the Court
likewise required courts to consider the economic harm caused by
government regulation and the “character” of that regulation, with21
out making it clear what “character” meant. Some lower court decisions (as well as some language in the Court’s own opinions), however, suggest that this factor refers to the weight of the public interest
supporting government regulation, apparently requiring courts to
balance the public interests favoring regulation against a property
22
owner’s economic harm and investment-backed expectations. Most
recently, the Court decided Lingle, which created confusion among
23
lower courts and placed the law in flux.
A. In the Beginning . . .
Until the early twentieth century, courts generally applied the
Takings Clause exclusively to physical seizures of private property, as
ings Clause; the most pro-regulation commentators argue that only physical appropriation of property by the government is a “taking,” while some libertarian-minded
commentators claim that all government regulations are “takings”); James W. Ely, Jr.,
“Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners,
2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 45 (arguing that the Penn Central test’s “indeterminate
factors provide little guidance to individuals”).
20
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); infra Part II.A.
21
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); infra notes 34–
42 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 62–87 and accompanying text.
23
See infra Part II.C.
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opposed to regulations that merely limited the use of a person’s
24
property. The first time the Supreme Court applied the Takings
Clause to a regulatory taking was the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal
25
Co. v. Mahon. In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company challenged the
constitutionality of a statute that restricted coal mining beneath private residences in order to prevent subsidence (i.e., a cave-in) of the
26
residence. The Court held that “while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak27
ing.”
In applying the “too far” test, the Pennsylvania Coal Court addressed both the degree of harm to the coal company and the public
interest justifying the regulation at issue. As to the private harm factor, the Court wrote that although property
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power . . . [o]ne fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation [is necessary] to sus28
tain the act.

The Court added that by making the coal company’s right to mine
coal “commercially impracticable . . . [the statute] has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying
29
it.” In other words, the anti-subsidence statute went “too far” because it virtually destroyed the value of the coal company’s property
interest.
The Court proceeded to hold that the public interest justifying
the statute was not “sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of
30
the [coal company’s] constitutionally protected rights.” The Court
offered two reasons for its conclusion. First, the government sought
to protect a single private house, which “in ordinary private affairs the
public interest does not warrant much [government] interference. A

24

See CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 320 (noting that Pennsylvania
Coal “generally is viewed as the origin of the regulatory takings doctrine”).
25
260 U.S. 393 (1922); see CALLIES, FREILICH & ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 320.
26
Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412–13. The coal company owned the mineral rights
to land beneath a house and sought to exercise those rights to dig out coal. Id. at
412.
27
Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
28
Id. at 413.
29
Id. at 414–15.
30
Id. at 414.

LEWYN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

602

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/1/2010 7:17 PM

[Vol. 40:597

source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance. . . . The
31
damage is not common or public.” Second, the statute “is not justi32
fied as a protection of personal safety” because the coal company
gave homeowners timely notice of its intent to mine under their
homes, allowing the homeowners to avoid physical harm from subsi33
dence.
Thus, Pennsylvania Coal suggested that, in determining whether a
taking goes “too far,” courts may consider the extent to which a government regulation harms a property owner and the extent to which
it protects the public interest.
B. Penn Central and Its Successors: The Three-Part Test
34

The Supreme Court paid little attention to regulatory takings
35
until its 1978 decision in Penn Central. In that case, a landowner
36
sought to build an office building above a railroad terminal. The
city prohibited construction because the terminal was a historic
37
landmark. The landowner then filed a takings action, asserting that
the enforcement of the historic landmark ordinance unconstitution38
ally seized the “air rights” above its building.
The Court wrote that its regulatory takings decisions
have identified several factors that have particular significance.
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
39
promote the common good.

31

Id. at 413.
Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
33
Id.
34
See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.4, at 417 (describing Penn Central as “[t]he next important regulatory takings decision”).
35
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
36
Id. at 116.
37
Id. at 117.
38
Id. at 119, 130.
39
Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
32
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Thus, the Court seemingly required lower courts to consider (1) the
economic impact of a regulation upon a property owner, (2) the regulation’s impact upon the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.
As to the first of these factors, the Court found that the city’s interference with the landowner’s property rights was not particularly
severe; the city did not interfere with the landowner’s current use of
its property and did not prevent the landowner from obtaining a rea40
sonable return on its investment. Furthermore, because the courts
had generally upheld regulations relating to air rights above buildings, the Court found that the ordinance did not disrupt the lan41
downer’s investment-backed expectations. The Court further found
that the city’s regulations were “substantially related to the promotion
42
of the general welfare.”
The Supreme Court applied all three Penn Central factors in the
43
1987 case of Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis. In Keys44
tone, a group of coal mine operators challenged the Pennsylvania
Subsidence Act, which required fifty percent of the coal beneath residences, public buildings, and cemeteries to be kept in place as a
45
means of providing surface support to those structures. The act also
authorized the state government to revoke mining permits whenever
46
coal mining damaged such structures. The basic purpose of the sta47
tute was to prevent the collapse of buildings above coal mines.
The Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania statute, holding
48
that each of the three Penn Central factors supported the statute. As
40
Id. at 136 (finding that the “[s]everity of the impact of the law” did not support
takings claim because the law “does not interfere in any way with the present uses of
the Terminal” and allowed the landowner “not only to profit from the Terminal but
also to obtain a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment”).
41
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130 n.27 (discussing case law that required
the Court to reject the claim “that full use of air rights is so bound up with the investment-backed expectations of appellants that government deprivation of these rights
invariably . . . constitutes a taking”) (emphasis added). The Court also noted that
because the law at issue did not interfere with the property’s current use as a railroad
terminal, it “does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.” Id. at 136.
42
Id. at 138.
43
480 U.S. 470.
44
Id. at 478.
45
Id. at 476–77.
46
Id. at 477.
47
See id. at 476–77 n.6.
48
Id. at 481, 485.
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to the “economic impact” and “investment-backed expectations” factors, the Court noted that the statute affected less than two percent of
plaintiffs’ coal, much of which could not be extracted for reasons un49
related to the statute. Thus, the regulation burdened “only a small
50
fraction of the property that is subjected to regulation” and there
was “no showing that petitioners’ reasonable ‘investment-backed expectations’ have been materially affected by the additional duty to retain the small percentage that must be used to support the structures
51
protected by [the statute].” Considering that the minimal economic
impact of the Pennsylvania law affected both the Court’s “reasonable
investment-backed expectations” discussion and its “economic harm”
discussion, Keystone suggests that these two Penn Central factors are intertwined: both relate to the degree of economic harm suffered by a
takings plaintiff.
As to the “character” factor, the Keystone Court held that “the
character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily
against finding a taking; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has
acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the com52
mon welfare.” In particular, the “character” factor supported the
state’s defense because there was no indication that the “statute [was]
53
enacted solely for the benefit of private parties” or that the state was
“exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nuis54
ance.” The Court’s suggestion that a legitimate state interest supported the statute implies that the “character” factor “requires a
55
weighing of public and private interests.”
Two Supreme Court decisions in 1980 and 1992 appeared to call
56
Penn Central into question. In Agins, a group of landowners challenged a zoning ordinance that allowed them to build only five
57
homes on a five-acre tract of land. The Court held that the ordin49

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 496.
Id. at 499–500 n.27.
51
Id. at 499.
52
Id. at 485.
53
Id. at 486.
54
Id. at 488.
55
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 492 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1980)). Note, however, that the Court’s direct statement to
this effect is of questionable precedential value, because the Court cited the nowoverruled Agins decision. See infra notes 91–99 and accompanying text (discussing
the Lingle Court’s rejection of Agins).
56
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
57
Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
50
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ance “substantially advance[d] legitimate governmental goals” such
59
as preventing the conversion of open space to urban use and avoid60
The Court subseing the negative results of such urbanization.
quently reformulated Agins to mean that a zoning ordinance is not a
compensable taking as long as it substantially advances a legitimate
61
government interest.
The Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council upheld a landowner’s takings claim challenging environmental legislation that allegedly prevented the landowner from erecting
62
any permanent habitable structures on his land. The Court held
that the legislation constituted a taking because the plaintiff was
“called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
63
of the common good.” The Court added, however, that even confiscatory regulation could avoid classification as a taking if it arose
from background principles of property law, such as nuisance regula64
tion.
58

Id. at 261.
Id.
60
Id. at 261 n.8 (citing the city council’s findings that urbanization might lead to
“‘air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood,
and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl’”) (quoting TIBURON, CAL.,
ORDINANCE NO. 124 N.S. § 1(c) (1973)).
61
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (suggesting that
Agins has been interpreted as a “stand-alone regulatory takings test that is wholly independent of Penn Central”). Note, however, that some language in Agins suggests
otherwise. Later in its decision, the Agins Court pointed out that the benefits of the
zoning ordinance “must be considered along with any diminution in market value
that the appellants may suffer” and that the plaintiffs “are free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials.”
Agins, 447 U.S. at 262. Because Agins referred to the “harm to plaintiff” Penn Central
factors (economic impact on landowners and investment-backed expectations) at
various points in its decision, see id. at 262–63, it appears that the Agins Court might
have actually intended to apply Penn Central, rather than to create a stand-alone regulatory takings test.
62
505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07, 1031–32.
63
Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original).
64
Id. at 1029. The Court explained that, even if regulation prohibits all economically beneficial use of land, it is not a taking if the regulation
inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved in the courts [by private plaintiffs] under the State’s law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally . . . .
59
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At least one lower court decision suggested that Lucas “removed
the weighing of public versus private interests in determining wheth65
er a taking has been effected” and that, after Lucas, any regulation
of property value was a compensable taking unless the government
“could articulate background principles [of property law] that prohi66
bit the uses [proposed by the landowner].”
But in 2001, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the three67
part Penn Central test in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. The Court there
held that Lucas applied only where a regulation eliminated all economically beneficial use of a landowner’s property, and that partial
regulatory takings were still subject to the Penn Central three-part
68
test. This three-part test required courts to consider the economic
effect of a regulation on property owners, the regulation’s interference with the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, and
69
the character of the government action. The Court’s plurality opinion did not explain the meaning of the “character” factor. But Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, which supplied the crucial fifth vote in
70
Palazzolo, noted that another significant factor in takings cases “is
the character of the government action. The purposes served, as well
as the effects produced, by a particular regulation inform the takings
analysis . . . . Regulatory takings cases ‘necessarily entai[l] complex
factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of govern71
ment actions.’”
Id.
65

Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
66
Id. Note, however, that this theory was not the most plausible interpretation of
Lucas, given the Lucas Court’s own suggestion that, under Penn Central, “in at least
some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with
total loss will recover in full.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 n.8.
67
533 U.S. 606.
68
Id. at 617.
69
Id.
70
Four Justices dissented, but both the plurality opinion and O’Connor’s concurrence reached their decision on grounds unrelated to the “character” factor.
Compare id. at 630 (plurality opinion) (remanding the case because the “claim [was]
not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the stateimposed restriction”) with id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the view
that state of title at the time plaintiff acquired property barred claim under “investment-backed expectations” factor). Thus, even if Justice O’Connor’s opinion is
treated as the opinion of the Court, her discussion of the “character” factor might be
viewed as dictum.
71
Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
523 (1992)).
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By mentioning the purposes and effects of government action,
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence suggested that courts should continue to consider the importance of the purpose animating that action,
as well as the relationship between that purpose and the action’s economic effects; in short, whether the government’s action effectively
furthered an important purpose.
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
72
Agency, the majority of the Court seemingly endorsed the Keystone
Court and Justice O’Connor’s view of the “character” factor. The Tahoe-Sierra Court held that the three-part Penn Central test, and not the
Lucas test, governed a temporary moratorium on real estate devel73
opment. In the course of its decision, the Court briefly explained
that the Penn Central test “entails complex factual assessments of the
74
purposes and economic effects of government actions.” The TahoeSierra Court’s reference to “purposes” implies that the purposes justifying a government action are relevant when assessing that action’s
75
constitutionality under Penn Central.
Between 2002 (when Tahoe-Sierra was decided) and 2005 (when
Lingle was decided), lower courts generally agreed that the Penn Central “character” factor required them to balance the public interest
favoring regulation against the impact regulation had on property
76
owners.
For example, in Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United

72

535 U.S. 302 (2002).
See id. at 320–21. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that “the mere
enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a property owner all
economically beneficial use of her property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional
obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that period” and instead
held that such regulations are “best analyzed within the Penn Central framework.” Id.
74
Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
75
Id. The Court, however did not address the question of whether the restrictions at issue were takings under Penn Central, holding only that the growth moratorium should be evaluated under the Penn Central test. Id. at 317–18 (noting that the
appropriate outcome under Penn Central was not at issue before the Court, because
the plaintiffs had disavowed reliance on Penn Central); id. at 342 (concluding that
“the [public] interest in ‘fairness and justice’ will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by attempting
to craft a new categorical rule”). Thus, the Court’s interpretation of Penn Central is
arguably dicta.
76
See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (discussing Bass Enterprises); see
also Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying takings claim in part because the government action was “designed to protect
health and safety,” thus leaning the “character” factor in favor of the government);
Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“In determining the character of the government action, courts must . . . balance appellees’
73
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States, the plaintiffs had leased land from the federal government and
77
sought permits to drill oil and gas wells on that land. The federal
78
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) denied the permits in 1994
because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was planning to
acquire the lease in order to prevent drilling from affecting a nearby
79
underground nuclear waste facility. After the EPA decided not to
80
The plaintiffs then
acquire the lease, BLM issued the permits.
sought compensation under the Takings Clause for the delay between the BLM’s denial of the permits and their subsequent approv81
al.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Penn Central “character of the government action” factor supported their claim unless the govern82
ment’s action “was designed to proscribe a nuisance.” Overruling its
83
own precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected this argument, quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and
84
Tahoe-Sierra. The court stated that “[a]s for the ‘character of the
Government action’ factor, the Tahoe-Sierra Court advocated an examination of the ‘purpose and economic effect’ of the government’s
actions . . . . We therefore consider the purpose of the regulation
and its desired effects in determining whether a taking has oc85
curred.” Applying this standard, the court rejected the plaintiffs’
takings claim, based partially on “the potential impact on the public
86
[from] . . . drilling near a nuclear waste site.” Thus, Bass Enterprises,

interests against the County’s needs to protect the public.”). But see K & K Constr.,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (focusing
on “whether the governmental regulation singles plaintiffs out to bear the burden
for the public good and whether the regulatory act being challenged here is a comprehensive, broadly based regulatory scheme that benefits and burdens all citizens
relatively equally”).
77
381 F.3d 1360, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
78
Id. at 1363.
79
Id. at 1366–68 (describing possible dangers from drilling in more detail).
80
Id. at 1363–64.
81
Id. at 1364.
82
Id. at 1369.
83
Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1369–70 (rejecting pre-Palazzolo Federal Circuit precedent that did not treat Penn Central as good law and explaining that Palazzolo “returned the temporary takings pendulum back to the familiar Penn Central analysis that existed prior to Lucas”).
84
Id. at 1370.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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87

like numerous other courts in the mid-2000s, held that partial regulatory takings claims generally required courts to balance a regulation’s harm to the plaintiff (the “economic impact” and “investmentbacked expectations” factors) against the public interest supporting
the regulation (the “character” factor).
C. Lingle and Its Aftermath
In 2005, the Supreme Court readdressed partial regulatory takings. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., an oil company challenged a
Hawaii law that limited the rent the company could charge gasoline
88
dealers who leased service stations from oil companies. The trial
court held that the rent control statute failed to “substantially ad89
vance a legitimate state interest,” and thus constituted an unconsti90
tutional taking based on the Agins “substantially advance” test.
91
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court reiterated its view
92
that, except under certain narrow circumstances, the Penn Central
93
test governs partial regulatory takings actions. The Court proceeded
to state that the Agins “substantially advance” test was more like the
test governing substantive due process actions than the Penn Central
94
test. Just as the Agins test requires courts to uphold any regulation
95
that is “effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose,” the
Court’s substantive due process precedent requires a court to uphold
a regulation unless it is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
96
welfare.” By contrast, Penn Central requires the Court to consider

87

See supra note 76.
544 U.S. 528, 532–33 (2005).
89
Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
90
Id. at 531–32 (citations omitted).
91
Id. at 548.
92
These circumstances include government regulations that create a permanent
physical invasion of a landowner’s property, regulations that render property economically useless, and exactions (government attempts to force a landowner to dedicate property to the public as a condition for obtaining a building permit). Id. at
538, 546–47.
93
Id. at 538.
94
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540–41.
95
Id. at 542 (emphasis omitted).
96
Id. at 541.
88
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not only the reasonableness of government action, but also the im97
pact of such action on a property owner.
After pointing out this inconsistency between Agins and Penn
Central, the Court proceeded to overrule Agins. The Court reasoned
that a standard that fails to address the burden government regulation imposes on property rights “is tethered neither to the text of the
Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing regulatory
98
actions to be challenged under the Clause.” Because lower courts’
applications of the Agins test “revealed its imprecisions,” the Court
remanded the case for further proceedings under the Penn Central
99
standard.
In addition to reaffirming its commitment to the Penn Central
test generally, the Court apparently reaffirmed its commitment to the
“character” factor specifically, stating: “[T]he ‘character of the government action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a
100
taking has occurred.”
Post-Lingle cases generally agree that lower courts must apply
Penn Central to partial regulatory takings cases, but are divided as to
the application of the Penn Central “character” factor. These cases fall
into three categories: (1) cases reaffirming the “private harm/public
interest” balancing test, (2) cases holding that the “character” factor
is limited to physical invasions and similar situations, and (3) cases
redefining the “character” factor as an inquiry into whether a small
number of property owners have been unfairly burdened by a gov101
ernment regulation.

97

Id. at 538–39 (recognizing “the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” as relevant factors under the Penn Central analysis (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
98
Id. at 542.
99
Id. at 548.
100
Id. at 539.
101
See Giovenella v. Conservation Comm’n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 462 (Mass.
2006) (noting that some courts have focused on whether a regulation unfairly singles
out a particular landowner while others have looked at whether a government action
resembles a physical invasion or whether the purpose of the regulation was to mitigate harm to the public, and declining to resolve the issue because, under any of
these tests, no taking occurred).
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At least one post-Lingle decision reaffirmed the view that courts
may balance the public interest furthered by a regulation against its
impact on takings plaintiffs. In Adams v. Village of Wesley Chapel, landowners challenged a zoning ordinance that limited the number of
102
lots into which their property could be subdivided.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina rejected the
103
landowners’ takings claim based on Penn Central. As to the “character” factor, the court explained:
The Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of local
governments seeking to protect against overcrowding and preserving the character of their areas. Here, the Village enacted a
land use restriction with the stated purpose “to provide for residential development at low densities consistent with suitability of the
104
land and the rural character of the village.”

In other words, the court held that the “character” factor favored the
government because its regulation effectively served a legitimate public purpose—limiting density in order to prevent overcrowding.
On the other hand, some decisions suggest that the “character”
factor is primarily relevant to cases involving physical invasion of
105
property.
For example, in RAR Development Associates v. New Jersey
School Construction Corp. (RAR), the state of New Jersey announced
plans to acquire a landowner’s property and subsidized the relocation
106
of one of the landowner’s tenants. Eventually, the state decided not
to acquire the property, causing the landowner to be stuck with the
107
land but no tenant. The landowner claimed that the inducements
102

No. 3:03cv411, 2006 WL 2689376, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2006); see also
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
“character” factor supported a statute requiring landowners to allow visitors to store
firearms in their vehicles, because regulation was designed to prevent “[crimes] of
general applicability ‘concern[ing] protection of the community as a whole rather
than individual citizens’”).
103
Adams, 2006 WL 2689376, at *3.
104
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
105
See Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 134 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (“County’s action did not physically invade or appropriate [plaintiff’s]
property or groundwater. Accordingly, that factor does not support a taking.”); Kafka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 28 (Mont. 2008) (“[U]nder
the ‘character of the governmental action’ prong courts should inquire concerning
the magnitude or character of the burden imposed by the regulation, and determine
whether it is functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of
private property.”); RAR Dev. Assocs. v. N.J. Sch. Constr. Corp., No. L-9424-05, 2008
WL 2663403, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2008).
106
2008 WL 2663403, at *1–2.
107
Id. at *2.
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the government gave to the tenant to vacate the property constituted
a taking because they effectively deprived the landowner of a te108
nant.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, noted that
the “character” factor “focuses primarily on whether the conduct
109
‘amounts to a physical invasion.’”
The court upheld the government’s action because its relocation assistance “did not cause a sub110
stantial destruction of the property’s beneficial use.”
The state
merely tried to acquire property for school construction in an orderly
manner by providing affected persons with relocation assistance as
111
early as possible. Because the infringement was so minor, the court
never actually applied the “character” factor. Thus, the RAR decision
implies that the “character” factor might be relevant only to takings
112
actions involving a physical invasion of property by the government.
A third group of cases focuses on whether “the burden of the
regulation falls disproportionately on relatively few property own113
ers.” For example, in Wensmann Realty v. City of Eagan, a landowner
sought to build houses on property zoned for a golf course and filed

108

Id.
Id. at *11. Note that the court presumably referred to temporary physical occupations, because a permanent physical occupation of property by government is
always a taking, and courts therefore need not apply the Penn Central test in such situations. See id.
110
Id. at *13.
111
Id. at *13. The court explained,
The governmental action here consisted of a good faith effort by the
State to act within the confines of the relevant statutory sections and
administrative regulations to acquire property for the construction of a
school. Extended lead time was needed for [the tenant’s] relocation,
and the orderly process of the intended acquisition of plaintiff’s improved property necessitated its early provision of relocation assistance.
Id.
112
Because no reported cases have cited RAR, the precise scope of the New Jersey
court’s holding remains unclear. Cf. infra Parts III.B.1, IV.B.1 (critiquing “physical
invasion” theory).
113
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007); see
also Small Prop. Owners of S.F. v. City & County of S.F., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 136
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding ordinance as “part of a broader scheme of allocating economic benefits and burdens between landlords and tenants for the public
good,” but without directly addressing impact of Lingle on the “character” factor); cf.
Tapps Brewing Inc. v. City of Sumner, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(where landowners challenged a city regulation forcing them to pay fees to fund an
upgrade to the city’s pipe system, “character” factor supported city because
“[p]laintiffs fail[ed] to provide any evidence showing that the City has not required
any other land owner to upgrade the pipe system”).
109
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a lawsuit after the city rejected its application for rezoning.
The
court interpreted the Lingle Court’s statement that takings jurispru115
dence should consider “how that burden is allocated” to mean that
courts should not balance the harm to a takings plaintiff against the
public interest favoring regulation because “the appropriate focus of
the character inquiry should be on the nature rather than on the me116
rit of the governmental action.” Therefore, the court asserted that
“an important consideration involves whether the regulation is general in application or whether the burden of the regulation falls dis117
proportionately on relatively few property owners.” In other words,
Wensmann suggests that, in some circumstances, the “character” factor favors compensation when only a few owners are harmed by government regulation and disfavors compensation when the burden of
118
regulation is widely distributed across society.
Applying this standard, the court held that the “character” factor
favored the landowner for two reasons. First, only a few private property owners were subject to the zoning category that included golf
119
courses (“Parks, Open Space, and Regulation”).
Second, the city
allowed other land near the golf course to be used for residential de120
velopment.
Thus, the costs of regulation disproportionately affected the plaintiff rather than being allocated broadly across socie121
ty.
III. WHY PRECEDENT FAVORS A “PRIVATE HARM/PUBLIC INTEREST”
BALANCING TEST
As explained above, the weight of pre-Lingle precedent interprets
the Penn Central “character of the government action” factor to support consideration of the public interest favoring regulation. Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo endorsed this view, as did the
Court’s opinion in Tahoe-Sierra.
Moreover, Lingle itself may reaffirm the “private harm/public interest” test. As noted above, the Lingle Court stated that “the ‘charac-

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

734 N.W.2d at 628–29.
Id. at 639 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 639.
See infra Parts III.B.2, IV.B.2 (critiquing this theory).
Wensmann Realty, Inc., 734 N.W.2d at 640.
Id.
Id.
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ter of the government action’—for instance whether it amounts to a
physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through
‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning
122
whether a taking has occurred.” The Lingle Court’s reference to the
“common good” suggests that the extent to which a regulation in fact
“promotes the common good” is relevant to the “character” factor.
Yet several commentators argue that Lingle bars any inquiry into
the broader public interests supporting regulation. Some contend
that Lingle implicitly eliminates the “character of the government ac123
tion” factor altogether, while others suggest that Lingle radically re124
defined the “character” factor.
A. Does Character Count at All?
The Lingle Court noted that its rejection of Agins “[did] not re125
quire [the Court] to disturb any of [its] prior holdings” (other
than, presumably, Agins itself). Nevertheless, Professor Dale Whitman argues that “if Lingle is taken seriously, it appears to destroy the
‘character of the governmental action’ prong of the Penn Central tak126
ings test.”
In support of this statement, Whitman focuses on the
Lingle Court’s statement that Penn Central “focuses directly upon the
severity of the burden that government imposes upon private proper127
According to Whitman, this statement excludes inquiry
ty rights.”
into “the government’s reasons or motivations for taking regulatory
128
action.”
But the Lingle Court’s statement that Penn Central “focuses direct129
ly upon the severity of the burden” need not necessarily bar consideration of other factors, such as the character of the government action. Considering that two of the three Penn Central factors address
130
the burden of government regulation on the plaintiff, the Penn Cen122

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added).
See infra Part III.A.
124
See infra Part III.B.
125
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
126
Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle, Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 573, 574 (2007).
127
Id. at 581 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).
128
Id.
129
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
130
These factors are the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest123
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tral Court most likely intended to focus on that burden. But emphasizing the burden on takings plaintiffs does not require courts to focus solely on that burden. Both the Penn Central and Lingle Courts’
131
explicit references to “the character of the government action” suggest otherwise.
Whitman also relies on the Lingle Court’s statement that Penn
Central “turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of
a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes
132
with legitimate property interests.”
According to Whitman, this
“language omits any reference to the third prong of Penn Central, the
‘character’ test, and it inserts the [“not exclusively”] language precisely because, I suspect, O’Connor [the author of Lingle] realized
that the unmentioned ‘character’ prong was inconsistent with the
133
Lingle opinion and could not survive it.” In other words, Whitman
argues that when the Court said liability does “not exclusively” turn
on the two “harm to plaintiff” factors (economic impact and interference with investment-backed expectations), then it must have meant
that liability does exclusively turn on those factors. But the Court said
that takings cases do “not exclusively” depend on the two “harm to
plaintiff” factors, thus it must have intended another factor to be re134
levant; and by reiterating its commitment to the “character” factor,
the Court seemingly held that the character of the government action
is the third factor.
Professor Eric Pearson, by contrast, concedes that Lingle explicit135
ly reaffirmed the Penn Central “character” factor, but nevertheless
argues that Lingle “effectively eviscerates the ‘character of the gov136
Pearson reasons that the
ernment action’ factor of Penn Central.”
character factor and the Agins “substantially advance” test “inquire of
the behavior of government rather than of the harm to property that
137
behavior might produce.” Thus, both tests “reside in the universe
of substantive due process. . . . Given that identity of purpose and ef-

ment-backed expectations.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
131
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
132
Whitman, supra note 126, at 582 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540).
133
Id.
134
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
135
Eric Pearson, Some Thoughts on the Role of Substantive Due Process in the Federal
Constitutional Law of Property Rights Protection, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008).
136
Id.
137
Id.
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fect, Lingle’s condemnation of the Agins test per force condemns the
138
Penn Central character factor as well.”
But there is a difference between the Penn Central and Agins
tests. The Lingle Court suggested that under the Agins “substantially
advance” test, the constitutionality of a government regulation rests
solely on its rationality, regardless of its impact on private property
139
owners. By contrast, the Penn Central test considers the character of
140
government action as just one factor among several. Thus, the balancing test is no more identical to substantive due process than is
141
any of the other balancing tests within constitutional jurisprudence.
If Penn Central is identical to substantive due process, so are balancing tests in (for example) the First Amendment context.
To understand the difference between substantive due process
and a true balancing test, imagine the following hypothetical: suppose the government has an excellent reason to enact a regulation
that reduces the value of a landowner’s property by ninety percent.
Under the “substantially advance” test, the landowner’s takings claim
fails; the government prevails because it had a substantial basis for its
decision. By contrast, under a “private harm/public interest” balancing test, the government’s excellent reason would be balanced
against the burden it imposes on the plaintiff, which means that the
government might actually lose the case. Thus, the substantive due
process/”substantially advance” test rejected in Lingle is quite different from the balancing test that Pearson criticizes. Moreover, Lingle
does not preclude the latter test.

138
139
140

Id.
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–42 (2005).
See Pearson, supra note 135, at 25. Pearson contends that
Penn Central designates three factors for balancing—economic harm,
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of
the government action. The problem is this: the first two factors . . . relate to the exercise of government power in a particular case. They inquire whether the government’s regulation, when applied to an individual, so harms that individual as to cause a taking. The character
factor, on the other hand, typically relates not at all to the specific exercise of government power implicated in a case. Rather, this latter
factor assesses the worthiness of a statute as a general matter.

Id.
141

See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849 (2006) (describing Fourth
Amendment balancing of interests); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)
(requiring a balancing of the parties’ interests where a public employer terminated
an employee for engaging in speech and the employee brought a First Amendment
action).
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Professor Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson, and Guillermo
Montero argue that even if substantive due process could be distinguished in theory from the “private harm/public interest” balancing
142
test, the Lingle Court itself equated the two standards. The authors
rely on the following language from Lingle:
[W]hether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose . . . has some logic in the context of a due process challenge . . . [b]ut such a test is not a valid
method of discerning whether private property has been ‘taken’
143
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.

But a look at the full context of the quoted language yields a more
nuanced conclusion. Starting from the beginning of the first quoted
sentence, the relevant portion of Lingle reads:
Although Agins’ reliance on due process precedents is understandable, the language the Court selected was regrettably imprecise. The “substantially advances” formula suggests a means-ends
test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is
effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose. An inquiry
of this nature has some logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul
of the Due Process Clause. But such a test is not a valid method
of discerning whether private property has been “taken” for pur144
poses of the Fifth Amendment.

The quoted language undeniably rejects the idea that any regulation
satisfying due process (i.e. any non-arbitrary regulation) is also permissible under the Takings Clause. But Lingle did not reject the balancing test proposed by Justice O’Connor in Palazzolo, which treats
the regulation’s effectiveness in achieving a public purpose as just
one of numerous factors to be considered in ascertaining the validity

142
Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, “Oh Lord, Please
Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 46 (2005) (arguing that Lingle forecloses
“consideration of the extent to which a challenged regulation actually serves the government interests sought to be advanced”).
143
Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542). Unlike Pearson, Lawson and his colleagues seek to redefine the “character” factor rather than eliminate it. See infra Part
IV.B.1 (describing and critiquing their proposed test). This Part addresses Lawson
and his colleagues’ critique of the balancing test because their argument is similar to
Pearson’s.
144
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (citation omitted).
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145

of the regulation. Under the “substantially advances” formula, any
truly legitimate purpose that in fact supports a regulation automatically safeguards the government against takings claims. But under
the “private harm/public interest” balancing test, a regulation’s legitimate purpose is merely part of the mix of factors to be considered
by the courts.
B. If the “Character” Element Survives Lingle, What Does It Mean?
Given that Lingle retains the three-part Penn Central test, does it
allow lower courts to consider the legitimacy of state interests as part
of the “character of the government action” assessment? There are
two reasons to believe that it does.
First, the Lingle Court itself suggested that whether a regulation
“affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
146
good’” may be a relevant consideration in the “character” analysis.
This language implies that a regulation’s effectiveness in facilitating
the “common good” may be relevant when assessing its “character.”
Second, Justice O’Connor, the same Justice who most vigorously affirmed the “private harm/public interest” balancing test in Palazzo147
148
lo, wrote the majority opinion in Lingle.
If Justice O’Connor intended an about-face, she probably would have been more explicit
about her choice.
Nevertheless, numerous commentators argue that the Lingle
Court repudiated the test balancing the public interest against the
plaintiff’s regulation-related harm in takings actions. Some argue
that Lingle limited the “character” factor to physical occupations of
149
property by government, while others argue that Lingle redefined
the “character” factor as a requirement that courts focus on whether
regulation disproportionately burdens a small group of property
150
owners. The following analysis will address each of these theories.

145

See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
146
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)). The Court noted that the issue “may be relevant in discerning
whether a taking has occurred.” Id.
147
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra notes 70–71
and accompanying text.
148
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 530.
149
See infra Part III.B.1.
150
See infra Part III.B.2.
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Does Lingle Limit the “Character” Factor to “Physical
Invasions”?

In their hornbook on land use, Juergensmeyer and Roberts
state,
In Lingle, the Court did not refer to a multi-factor balancing test.
Rather, when reciting the Penn Central factors, the Lingle Court
gave a physical invasion as its example of the character factor
[and therefore] the government ought not be able to argue the
151
importance of its regulation’s purpose in defense.

Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, stated
that the “character” factor “focuses primarily on whether the conduct
152
‘amounts to a physical invasion.’” Such references appear to emanate from the following passage in Lingle: “the ‘character of the governmental action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a
153
taking has occurred.”
If the Lingle Court intended to hold that the “character” factor
was relevant only to physical invasions, it could have done so quite
easily by writing: “The ‘character of the government action’ factor
means that a taking has presumably occurred if government action
amounts to a physical invasion, but is irrelevant if no physical invasion
occurred.” Instead, the Court created a dichotomy between regulations amounting to a physical invasion, which are more likely to be
154
considered takings, and public programs “adjusting the benefits
155
It
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”
follows that even after Lingle, courts may weigh a regulation’s effect
on the “common good” against the economic harm it causes.
2.

Does Lingle Redefine “Character” as an Unfair Burden?

The Lingle Court noted that one reason it rejected the “substantially advance” test was because the “inquiry reveals nothing about the
151
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.6, at 430 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 539).
152
RAR Dev. Assocs. v. N.J. Sch. Constr. Corp., No. L-9424-05, 2008 WL 2663403,
at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2008) (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).
153
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)) (emphasis added).
154
Id.
155
Id.
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magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes
upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any information
about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property own156
According to Christopher Goodin, this language means that
ers.”
because the effectiveness of a regulation in achieving a legitimate
public purpose “does not reveal either the burdens imposed or the
benefits conferred by a regulation . . . inquiry into effectiveness of a
157
regulation is invalid in the context of takings challenges.” Goodin
points out the Lingle Court’s statement that “[t]he owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a
158
property subject to an ineffective regulation.”
In other words, Goodin seems to adopt the following syllogism:
Premise 1: In regulatory takings actions, courts may consider the
question of whether government regulation singles out a property
owner for an unfair burden—a principle violated by the “substantially
advance” test.
Premise 2: A “private harm/public interest” balancing test fails
to adequately address the question of whether a regulation singles
out a property owner for an unfair burden. Thus, it is just as inconsistent with Lingle as the “substantially advance” test.
Conclusion: The Lingle Court therefore would reject such a balancing test.
Premise 1 is undeniably supported by the Penn Central Court’s
statement that the Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
159
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” and
therefore a taking occurs “when ‘justice and fairness’ require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on
160
a few persons.”
Thus, the Takings Clause does not bar considera161
tion of whether a property owner was singled out for regulation.
156

Id. at 542.
Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content of the Character of the Governmental
Action Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings Analysis, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 437, 444
(2007); see also cases cited supra note 105.
158
Goodin, supra note 157, at 444 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543).
159
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123.
160
Id. at 124.
161
Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
20–28 (2008) (articulating theoretical justifications for considering this factor).
157
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But Premise 2 is flawed. Even a balancing test that considers the
public purpose supporting a government regulation can consider the
fairness of burdening a small group of property owners to further
that public purpose. As Justice O’Connor wrote in her Palazzolo concurrence:
[T]his constitutional guarantee is “‘designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”
The concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the Takings
Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Accordingly, we
have eschewed “any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice
and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.” . . .
We have “identified several factors that have particular significance” in these “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” Two such
factors are “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.” Another
is “the character of the governmental action.” The purposes
served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular regulation
162
inform the takings analysis.

In the first few sentences of the above passage, Justice O’Connor
emphasizes that the Takings Clause is designed to prevent “forcing
some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
163
should be borne by the public as a whole.” But she then proceeds
to cite to sources which state that in deciding what fairness requires,
courts may consider “the purposes and economic effects of govern164
ment actions.”
Thus, Justice O’Connor saw no contradiction between protecting property owners from unfair burdens and weighing
the state interests that justify those burdens.
Justice O’Connor’s view makes sense. Even if courts do not address the existence of unfair burdens when addressing the “character” factor, such unfairness may be relevant when analyzing the “eco165
nomic harm to the property owner” element of Penn Central.
If a
162

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–34 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
163
Id. at 633 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123–24).
164
Id. at 634 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
165
Alternatively, courts could interpret the “character” factor to require consideration of both the public interest underlying the regulation and the extent to which
plaintiffs are disproportionately burdened by regulation. But given the vagueness of
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land use regulation reduces a plaintiff’s property value by ninety percent, the plaintiff has likely been disproportionately burdened—
unless every nearby owner of similar property has also suffered a ninety percent loss due to government regulation, a result that is likely
to occur only when the plaintiff seeks to use his land in the same way
166
as all owners of similar property.
Two hypothetical situations illustrate how land use regulation
that singles out a landowner for disproportionate burdens is likely to
be accompanied by a significant economic impact upon that plaintiff.
In case A, landowner A lost fifty percent of her property’s resale value
due to a government regulation restricting development. But nearby
landowners suffered similar losses. In this situation, A’s land may be
less marketable than before in comparison to property in other cities,
but her land is no less marketable in relation to her neighbors’ property.
In case B, landowner B’s land lost fifty percent of its long-term
resale value, but unlike landowner A in the first hypothetical, B is the
only property owner in her town who cannot develop her land. Thus,
167
“the burden of the regulation falls disproportionately” on B. In this
case, landowner B is worse off not only in absolute terms, but also in
relation to other nearby landowners. Someone looking to buy land
in B’s town will prefer other landowners’ land to B’s, because the
former is not restricted by government regulation. It logically follows
that landowner B suffered a greater economic harm than landowner
A precisely because a land use regulation singled out B.
This illustration demonstrates how, contrary to Premise 2 above,
a “singled out” plaintiff such as B has an unusually strong case under
the “economic harm” prong of Penn Central—even if the Court continues to focus the “character” prong on the public interest justifying
regulation. If courts indirectly consider B’s interest in avoiding being
singled out under the “economic harm” prong of Penn Central, it is

both concepts, requiring courts to regularly balance the two factors may be more
confusing than the balancing test addressed in the text. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining why the “unfair burden” concept is so confusing that it should generally not
be the primary focus of judicial inquiry).
166
In fact, zoning often increases, rather than decreases, property values. See Timlin Kate Sanders, Making Landowners Whole Without Putting Holes in Zoning: Personal
Waivers as the Solution to the Partial Regulatory Takings Compensation Issue, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 513, 541 (2008) (“[T]he cost of housing has risen dramatically higher
than the actual construction cost of homes in the past thirty years, and research
shows a correlation between zoning and inflated housing prices.”).
167
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007).
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essentially double counting to consider the same interest under the
“character” prong. Accordingly, the “private harm/public interest”
balancing test is consistent with protecting singled out property owners.
IV. BUT IS BALANCING INTERESTS GOOD POLICY?
Given the apparent ambiguity of Lingle, lower courts may have
discretion to consider public policy in interpreting the “character”
factor. As explained above, pre-Lingle courts often balanced the economic harm government regulation imposed on a property owner,
the disruption to the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, and the extent to which the regulation effectively promoted the
168
public interest.
The affirmative case for continuing to follow this “private
harm/public interest” balancing test is simple: as long as courts are
required to implement the inherently vague Penn Central balancing
169
test, they should also consider the public interest because it is something courts know how to do. In a wide variety of contexts, courts use
balancing tests to determine whether the broader public interest fa170
vors a plaintiff’s claim or a defendant’s defense.
The fact that
168

See supra notes 8, 76–87 and accompanying text.
See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 8, § 10.6, at 429 (Penn Central’s “indeterminate factors provide little guidance to individuals”); id. § 10.7, at 431 (“The
Court has not defined ‘investment-backed expectations.’”); id. at 433 (“‘[T]here is
no readily identifiable pattern to state court investment-backed expectations decisions.’” (quoting J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are InvestmentBacked Land Use Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB. LAW. 81, 110
(2006))).
170
See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 378 (2008)
(requiring courts to consider “the balance of equities and the public interest,”
among other factors, when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction);
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (requiring
courts to “balance the family’s privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure” when interpreting a Freedom of Information Act provision prohibiting the
government from disclosing law enforcement records that would constitute “an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–
300 (1999) (requiring courts to “evaluate [a] search or seizure under traditional
standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” when historical
analysis does not dictate whether a particular government action violates the Fourth
Amendment); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring courts to
consider a variety of factors, including both the recipient’s interest and “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement [preferred by the
169
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courts are accustomed to such balancing favors treating the “character of the public action” as “the strength of the public interest favoring the government’s regulation,” either alone or in combination
with other factors.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that either the “private
harm/public interest” balancing test should be rejected on other
grounds or that alternative tests are just as practical. The following
analysis will address each of these contentions.
A. Is Balancing Fair?
Goodin contends that any balancing test that considers the purpose of a regulation creates an unfair distinction between a landowner who loses property through eminent domain and a landowner
whose property is rendered less valuable by a less intrusive regulation;
specifically, he argues that if the public need does not immunize government from its duty to compensate in an eminent domain action,
there is no compelling reason to treat regulatory takings actions dif171
ferently.
In fact, regulatory takings and eminent domain takings are quite
different and should be governed by different rules. In an eminent
domain action, a landowner loses the physical use of his property.
The landowner’s loss is so complete that it makes sense to compensate him fully for his loss regardless of the public interest involved.
By contrast, a partial regulatory takings plaintiff can still use her land,
even if she cannot exploit that land to its full economic potential.
Unless courts hold that reductions in value, or all reductions above a

recipient] would entail” when deciding whether the termination of government benefits violates due process).
171
See Goodin, supra note 158, at 446 (contending that any Takings Clause test
that considers the public interest underlying regulation “forces courts to unfairly discriminate against regulatory takings claimants. This stems from the disparate impact
that results when condemnees (eminent domain) are approached differently than
inverse condemnees (regulatory takings)”). John Echeverria rejects relying directly
on the purpose of government regulation because
[i]t would make no sense in a condemnation case, for example, to suggest that the government should be excused from its obligation to pay
for a school site because the school will serve a vital educational need.
Likewise, . . . it makes no sense to suggest that the government’s liability to pay compensation on account of its regulatory actions should vary
with the importance of the public purpose served by the regulation.
John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171,
206 (2005).
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173

certain level, are always compensable, they must adopt some kind
of test to determine which landowner losses are compensable takings
and which are not. This means that courts must treat partial regulatory takings differently from eminent domain takings. The Supreme
Court apparently agrees; Lingle and its predecessors held that litigation involving a less-than-total loss is governed by the three-factor
Penn Central test, rather than by rules governing eminent domain ac174
tions.
B. Are the Alternatives Any Better?
Commentators who assert that Lingle rejects the “private
harm/public interest” balancing test generally propose defining the
“character of the government action” prong as an analysis of (a) the
government action’s similarity to physical invasions and/or other
government actions generally recognized as takings, and (b) the extent to which the government action singled out a small number of
175
property owners for regulation. The following analysis argues that
these proposed standards are either less practical than the “private
harm/public interest” test or harder to square with Supreme Court
precedent.

172

This would be the case if the Court held that all losses above a certain percentage (e.g., ninety percent of resale value) were compensable. The Court, however,
appears to have rejected this view in Palazzolo. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 616 (requiring application of the Penn Central balancing test, even though the
plaintiff lost ninety-three percent of his property’s resale value due to regulation; his
parcel would be worth over $3.1 million if fully developed, but retained only
$200,000 in development value as a result of regulation).
173
Indeed, some theorists argue that any reduction in property value is a compensable “taking.” See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholarship?, 30 STAN. L. REV. 635, 640 (1978) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977)) (“Any diminution of rights in the bundle of
any holder . . . amounts to a taking under the law.”). But for the purposes of this Article, I assume that the Supreme Court will continue to follow its current precedent
rather than adopt such theories. Whether such precedent correctly interprets the
Takings Clause is beyond the scope of this Article.
174
See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
175
See infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2. In addition, Whitman proposes that courts consider public purpose by considering the “necessity” of a regulation as a defense to a
taking claim. See Whitman, supra note 132, at 589–90. Whitman reasons that existing
precedent allows “background principles of nuisance and property law [to provide] a
defense to a takings claim,” id. at 582, and that public necessity is such a “background
principle.” Id. at 589–90. This test, however, as Professor Whitman explains, presupposes that the Lingle Court meant to eliminate the “character of the government
action” element of Penn Central—a conclusion that I reject. See id. at 581–82.
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The Problem with “Physical Invasion” Tests

Lawson and his colleagues assert that the most plausible understanding of the “character” factor is that “it is designed to evaluate
the extent to which the government action resembles what has been
176
uncontroversially understood to constitute a taking.” They contend
that
it is sensible to envision a continuum along which government actions at one end, such as permanent physical occupations, effect a
taking per se because they closely resemble the formal exercise of
the eminent domain power, whereas government actions at the
other end, such as routine land use regulations, almost certainly
177
would not effect a taking.

Under this approach, if a regulation somehow resembles a permanent physical occupation, the “character” factor kicks in. If not, the
“character” factor is irrelevant.
This version of the “character” test is fairly easy to apply when
178
the government temporarily occupies property. In that situation, a
court can define the “character” factor as the length of the occupation and then balance it against the economic loss to the plaintiff:
179
high economic loss plus long occupation equals a taking; low economic loss plus short occupation equals no taking; high economic
loss plus short occupation, or low economic loss plus long occupation, equals a close case.
But what if a landowner challenges a development restriction rather than a physical occupation? In that case, according to Lawson
and his colleagues, the government’s action is presumably a “routine
land use regulation” in which case the “character” factor disappears
and there is nothing against which to weigh the two “harm to plaintiff” factors (economic impact plus disruption of investment-backed
expectations). How can courts weigh two similar factors against nothing? Only by dramatically reshaping Penn Central.

176

Lawson, Ferguson & Montero, supra note 142, at 46.
Id.; see also D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69
ALB. L. REV. 343, 354 n.55 (2005) (endorsing this test).
178
If the government permanently occupies property, its action is automatically a
compensable taking and Penn Central is irrelevant. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Inc., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
179
This not only includes the direct decrease in the plaintiff’s property value, but
also the effect, if any, on her reasonable investment-backed expectations.
177
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For example, courts could hold that if the landowner’s losses ex180
ceed a certain threshold amount, a taking exists, even though the
“character” factor is irrelevant. But in Palazzolo, the Court indicated
that compensation may not be necessary even when the regulation
181
caused a ninety-three percent loss in property value. Thus, such a
test might be difficult to square with Supreme Court precedent. Alternatively, courts could hold that there is presumptively no taking if
a landowner suffers a less-than-total loss in value from “routine” regulation, because the “character” factor is irrelevant and the landown182
er’s interests are not strong enough to support his takings claim.
This rule would certainly be easy to apply, but it would be inconsistent with the Penn Central Court’s intent to base regulatory takings
183
The Lingle
decisions on “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”
Court indicated that it agreed with Penn Central’s assertion that it was
“unable to develop any ‘set formula for evaluating regulatory takings
184
claims.’”
Thus, Lingle also seems to prefer ad hoc balancing to
“bright line” tests. Accordingly, any attempt to draw a line between
physical occupations and “routine” regulations might be inconsistent
with both Penn Central and Lingle.
2.

Pure Reciprocity and “Reciprocity Plus”

Numerous commentators define the “character” factor as reciprocity—the extent to which the burdens of regulation are fairly
shared across the population. This test has the advantage of being at
least somewhat consistent with precedent; the Court has repeatedly

180

Another option is multiple thresholds: one in cases where the landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations have been adversely affected by government
regulation, and a higher threshold where the landowner’s expectations, if any, were
unreasonable.
181
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001); see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (diminution in value at 87.5 percent but not compensable).
182
Professor Lawson and his colleagues suggest that “routine land use regulations
. . . almost certainly would not effect a taking.” Lawson, Ferguson & Montero, supra
note 142, at 46.
183
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reaffirming commitment
to ad hoc balancing); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
184
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. at 124).
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185

referred to reciprocity in its Takings Clause decisions. But the major reciprocity-based tests that have been proposed add additional levels of complexity to an already complex status quo and add little value to the simpler balancing test proposed above. Goodin and John
Echeverria proposed the most detailed reciprocity-based tests.
Goodin argues that a regulation’s fairness should be inferred
from five factors:
(1) Reciprocity of advantage. That is, whether a takings plaintiff
186
benefits from other regulations, or “has been unfairly singled out to
shoulder a disproportionate share of public burdens without corres187
ponding benefits.”
(2) Whether a regulation abrogates a basic property right, such
188
as the rights of “exclusive possession, use, and disposition.”
(3) Whether a plaintiff voluntarily assumes a regulatory bur189
den.
(4) Whether a plaintiff’s proposed land use constitutes a nuis190
ance.
(5) The existence of “rational retroactivity.” That is, to the extent regulation is retroactive, whether past benefits implicitly com191
pensate a takings plaintiff for any harm done by regulation.
In other words, Goodin proposes five factors for the final prong
of the three-part Penn Central test, thereby multiplying the complexity
of the law. Moreover, not all of these elements are tremendously
clear. How can a court decide when a land use regulation creates
“reciprocity of advantage”? Goodin asserts that “[s]o long as the ordinance applies broadly to other people in the surrounding community, the landowner is also benefitted by the restrictions that the or192
dinance places upon his neighbors.”
But how broadly should one

185

See Alan Romero, Ends and Means In Takings Law After Lingle v. Chevron, 23 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 333, 363 (2008) (discussing relevant precedent in more detail).
186
Goodin, supra note 158, at 447.
187
Id. at 449.
188
Id. at 450.
189
Id. at 452–53.
190
Id. at 454.
191
Id. at 456. But see Echeverria, supra note 171, at 201–02 (asserting that retroactivity is irrelevant after Lingle, because Lingle held that “a legitimate governmental
action is a precondition for a valid taking claim” and retroactivity, as an issue related
to the “legitimacy” of government action, is only relevant to due process claims).
192
Goodin, supra note 158, at 447–48.
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define these restrictions? Does reciprocity exist whenever a burdened landowner’s neighbors are covered by some sort of zoning
193
regulation? Does it exist only when the landowner’s neighbors are
194
subject to the identical zoning classification?
Or does it exist only
when the plaintiff’s neighbors suffer just as much from the zoning
classification as the plaintiff? And which landowners should be included in the group “burdened” by the zoning regulation—all landowners covered by the regulation, only those who have lost some
195
value, or only those who have lost the most value?
And when is government regulation “voluntarily assumed” by a
plaintiff? The only relevant land-use regulation case cited by Goo196
din, Yee v. City of Escondido, upheld a rent control ordinance and
noted that the landlords “voluntarily rented their land to [te197
nants].”
Goodin notes that the landlords “implicitly accepted the
restrictions imposed upon them by . . . failing to seek a zoning
198
change.”
Does this mean that a landowner automatically accepts
the regulatory status quo if he or she fails to seek a rezoning? And if
so, does this mean that the “character” factor will normally favor a
takings plaintiff who unsuccessfully seeks a rezoning?
Echeverria proposes a seemingly less complex two-part “reciprocity plus” test, arguing that, except in certain unusual circums199
tances, the “character” element of Penn Central requires courts to
examine (a) reciprocity (i.e., “whether the regulation targets one or a
193
See Romero, supra note 185, at 369 (“Some have argued that even if a particular
regulation does not directly benefit the burdened owner by restraining others, every
rational land use regulation makes a better community and thus benefits every citizen and every property in the community, including the regulated owners and their
property.”). But see Barros, supra note 177, at 354 n.56 (criticizing such arguments as
unrealistic; for example, if only wetland-property owners are affected by wetlands
regulation, those “property owners bear all the burdens of the regulation while obtaining only a fraction of the public benefit”).
194
Goodin seems to adopt this view by suggesting that the landmark preservation
law in Penn Central “secured an average reciprocity of advantage for the railroad
owner, because the law effected the designation of over four-hundred landmarks,
many of which were located nearby the terminal.” Goodin, supra note 158, at 448.
195
Cf. Davidson, supra note 161, at 39–40 (“[T]he class of ‘differentially burdened
property holders’ is entirely malleable.”).
196
Goodin, supra note 158, at 452–53.
197
503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992).
198
Goodin, supra note 158, at 453.
199
Echeverria points out that where government physically occupies private property or limits the right to devise property to heirs, the “character” factor favors recovery under the Takings Clause, even if the factors discussed below are irrelevant. See
Echeverria, supra note 171, at 203–04.
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200

few owners or is more general in application”) and (b) “whether a
201
regulation is benefit-conferring or harm-preventing.”
As to the first factor, Echeverria provides a simple example: if a
community creates an agricultural zone to limit development, but the
zone encompasses only one farm, the “character” factor supports the
202
farmer’s takings claim. But the extent to which a landowner is disproportionately burdened may not always be so clear. Suppose, for
example, that there are ten homeowners on a block zoned for lowdensity residential property. One of the homeowners wishes to build
a slightly higher density residence—for example, by adding an extra
room to be used as a rental unit. The zoning regulation precludes
this renovation, which reduces the potential resale value of the
homeowner’s property by ten percent. A second homeowner wants
to demolish her house and build a factory. The zoning regulation
prohibits this project, which reduces the potential resale value of the
property by ninety percent.
Even if the two homeowners are the only people burdened by
203
the low-density zoning regulation, the proper fate of their possible
takings claims is unclear. Were both homeowners equally burdened?
Or is the more ambitious homeowner—the one who wanted to build
a factory—more heavily burdened? If the former is correct, then two
different situations are being treated the same. If the latter is correct,
then the homeowner who seeks to radically change the neighborhood is in a stronger litigating position than the one who wishes to
204
make a small improvement—hardly a desirable result.
In sum,
200

Id. at 204. The Minnesota Supreme Court seems to have adopted a test similar
to that proposed by Echeverria, at least insofar as it relates to the burden of the regulation; see Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007)
(requiring similar considerations of “whether the regulation is general in application
or whether the burden of the regulation falls disproportionately on relatively few
property owners”).
201
Echeverria, supra note 171, at 207.
202
Id. at 204–05; see also Wensmann Realty, 734 N.W.2d at 640 (finding that the reciprocity element favored the plaintiff who was one of “only a few private property
owners subject to the . . . land use designation” at issue).
203
Wensmann Realty, 734 N.W.2d at 640 (holding that the plaintiff was disproportionately burdened by zoning because it was “not a situation where numerous property owners are subject to the same kind of land use restrictions, and a single property owner is asking the city to allow a new, different use”). The Court’s reasoning
implies that there would not have been a disproportionate burden if numerous owners were bound by, and satisfied with, the regulatory status quo.
204
It could be argued that the same result occurs if unfair burdens on landowners
are considered to be a part of Penn Central’s “economic impact” factor, but this is not
the case. Under my interpretation of Penn Central, the factory-builder might have a
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there will often be no easy way to determine if a regulation evenly dis205
tributes burdens.
A second weakness of focusing on benefits and burdens is the
difficulty of deciding whether a regulation both benefited and burdened an individual takings plaintiff. In particular, Echeverria argues
that the “reciprocity of advantage cannot logically be confined to examining the countervailing benefits produced by the specific regula206
tion under challenge,” because a plaintiff may also benefit from
other regulations. For example, a landowner burdened by wetlands
207
regulation may benefit from historic-preservation laws, or vice versa.
Thus, “considering all the countervailing benefits of different regulatory programs may make it virtually impossible to determine whether
a regulated party is suffering a net loss from all of society’s regulated
208
programs.”
So how does Echeverria resolve this problem? By asking courts
to consider the public interest favoring regulation—not directly, but
as a means of determining the reciprocal benefit that regulation provides to a property owner. He explains that
[t]he magnitude of these reciprocal benefits will depend in substantial part on the public importance and value of the objective
served by the regulations. So long as a regulation applies broadly
across the community, the value or importance of what the government is seeking to accomplish should weigh against the tak209
ings claim.

Thus, Echeverria asks judges to consider the benefits that a particular
regulation provided a property owner but acknowledges that the only
way to do so is by determining the strength of the public interest

stronger case under the “economic impact” prong of Penn Central, but would have a
much weaker case under the “character” factor due to the city’s strong interest in
keeping factories away from residential neighborhoods. Cf. Euclid v. Ambler Realty,
272 U.S. 365, 388–89 (1926) (noting the public interest in such exclusion). But under a reciprocity-based test, the factory builder might win under both prongs of Penn
Central: she prevails under the “economic impact” prong because the value of her
property was reduced by ninety percent, and she might prevail under the “character”
prong because, as the neighborhood’s only would-be factory builder, she was singled
out for regulation. Given the Euclid Court’s apparent view that the public interest
favors separating industry from housing, see id., this result makes little sense.
205
See Davidson, supra note 161, at 44–45 (“Equally challenging is finding a neutral metric to evaluate an acceptable distribution of burdens.”).
206
Echeverria, supra note 171, at 205.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 207.
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supporting the regulation—essentially adding an extra step to an already complex Takings Clause inquiry.
The other element of Echeverria’s reciprocity-based test is
whether a regulation is designed to confer benefits or prevent harm
to the public. Echeverria contends that this distinction is important
because, “while it will sometimes make sense to require those who
benefit from regulation to redistribute the gains to those burdened
by the regulations, it will generally make less sense to require those
protected from harm to pay those who have been restrained from
210
harming others and the community.” Echeverria essentially makes
a public-interest argument: “harm-preventing” regulations are supported by a stronger public interest than “benefit-conferring” ones.
Few courts, however, are likely to adopt the “harm/benefit” distinction that Echeverria proposes. As Echeverria concedes, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Lucas “disparaged the entire notion that benefit-conferring regulations could be distinguished, ‘on
211
an objective, value-free-basis,’ from harm-preventing regulations.”
Echeverria correctly notes that this language does not completely foreclose his theory, because Lucas was not decided under the Penn Cen212
tral balancing test. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court would adopt a distinction in the Penn Central context that it
criticized in Lucas.
Ultimately, Echeverria’s two-factor test requires courts to focus
on the weight of the public interest supporting regulation. Thus, in
most situations, his test will likely render the same results as the “private harm/public interest” balancing test, and it has the added drawbacks of being more complex and requiring the courts to go through
some extra steps.
V. HOW TO CONSIDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST
For the reasons stated above, courts analyzing the “character”
factor should consider the public interest supporting the alleged taking. But this principle alone does not give courts much guidance.
Given that the courts should weigh the public interest supporting a
regulation, how precisely should they do it? And should considera210

Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
212
Echeverria, supra note 171, at 177 (“[T]he statement was made in the context
of a case involving regulation that rendered property valueless, and the decision
cannot necessarily be read as repudiating the harm-benefit distinction outside that
context, that is, in a Penn Central case.”).
211
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tion of the public interest bar courts from using other criteria discussed above as part of the “character” analysis?
A. How to Weigh the Public Interest
213

The recent case of Resource Investments, Inc. v. United States provides a helpful illustration of how to properly weigh the nature of the
public interest. In Resource Investments, two landowners built a landfill
on a site containing wetlands, but only after spending nearly a decade
214
trying to obtain state and federal permits.
The plaintiffs asserted
that certain procedural steps imposed by the federal government
215
constituted a compensable taking.
The Court of Federal Claims denied the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment, holding that there was a genuine factual dispute about whether the “character” factor weighed in favor of the
216
plaintiffs or the government.
The court began by noting that
courts must “weigh the benefits, burdens, and distribution of a regulatory burden as part of this prong. This requires an ‘inquir[y] into
the degree of harm created by the claimant’s proposed activity, its social value and location, and the ease with which any harm stemming
217
from it could be prevented.’”
Applying this test, the court found that the government’s regula218
tions advanced a “valid public interest” because they were designed
219
to protect wetlands and nearby navigable waters from pollution. In
particular, the government needed to regulate landfills because land-

213

85 Fed. Cl. 447 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
Id. at 457–62 (describing the permit process in detail, noting in particular that
the plaintiffs’ first permit application was in 1989 and that they were unable to begin
construction of landfill until 1998).
215
Id. at 457. The plaintiffs claimed that the “character” factor favored their takings claim because the federal government unreasonably required them to change
their project’s statement of purpose from creating “a municipal solid waste landfill”
to “a viable, affordable, environmentally sound solid waste project” and that this “involuntary revision converted their private enterprise into a de facto public project,
thus forcing them alone to shoulder what should be the public burden of protecting
a private good.” Id. at 516.
216
Id. at 519.
217
Id. at 517–18 (quoting Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
218
Id. at 519.
219
Res. Invs., Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 518 (stating that the regulation meant to “protect
navigable waters by preserving wetlands hydrologically linked to those navigable waters”).
214
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fills sometimes contaminate nearby groundwater.
On the other
hand, the court found that the risk of such contamination was “vani221
shingly small,” and the plaintiffs produced evidence “strongly suggesting that the [government] treated them differently than other
222
These competing interests created a
similarly-situated applicants.”
223
dispute of material fact sufficient to bar summary judgment.
The court’s “character” analysis in Resource Investments focused
not only on the importance of the public purpose supporting the
type of regulation at issue, but also on the effectiveness of the regulation—that is, the extent to which the precise action taken by the government furthered the stated public purpose. The court found that
the general purpose of landfill regulation (preventing water pollu224
tion) favored the government’s permit delays, but also found that
the low likelihood of actual pollution and the apparent arbitrariness
225
of government decision making favored the plaintiffs’ claim. Thus,
the government cannot avoid liability merely by showing that the
public interest favored some sort of regulation; instead, it must show
that the policies support both regulation in general and its specific
conduct in the case at issue.
B. What About Physical Invasions and Singled-Out Plaintiffs?
The analysis above seeks to show that in takings actions, courts
should focus their “character” analysis on whether the public interest
supported the government regulation at issue. But this conclusion
leaves open the question of whether the courts should focus exclusively on this factor or consider additional factors raised by lower
courts in the past—most notably, whether the regulation is similar to
a physical invasion, and the extent to which the plaintiff was “singled
out” for regulation.
The Lingle Court resolved the first issue when it stated that “‘the
character of the government action’—for instance whether it
amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be re220

Id. (noting “serious potential for public health problems should the landfill
leach into the groundwater”).
221
Id.
222
Id. at 519.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 518–19.
225
Res. Invs., Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 519.
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levant in discerning whether a taking has occurred.” This language
clearly indicates that the “character” factor requires courts to decide
227
whether government conduct “amounts to a physical invasion.”
If
228
so, the government’s conduct is more likely to be a taking. If not,
the plaintiff’s takings claim is more likely to fail.
229
The second issue is more complex. As noted above, it is difficult to know whether a regulation singles out a property owner or
whether it distributes a burden fairly and evenly among property
owners. On the other hand, it is well settled that the Takings Clause
is meant “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
230
the public as a whole.” Thus, the extent to which a property owner
is “singled out” for an unfair burden cannot be completely irrelevant
in Takings Clause jurisprudence.
But this does not mean that the existence (or lack thereof) of an
unfair burden needs to be a fourth element of a Penn Central-based
balancing test, nor does it mean that the “character” factor will gen231
erally require analysis of such unfairness. As explained above, a
property owner who has been unfairly burdened by government regulation is likely to have suffered a large economic loss, while a property owner who suffered a minimal economic loss is not as likely to
have been singled out for excessive regulation. So even if a property
owner can credibly claim to have been singled out, to consider this
fact under the “character” prong of Penn Central may lead to doublecounting, that is, considering the same fact—the property owner’s
economic harm from being singled out for overregulation—under
both the “character” prong and the “economic harm” prong.
Admittedly, disproportionate economic burden is not the only
way to determine whether a property owner has been “singled out”
for unfair regulation. For example, in Resource Investments, the plaintiffs claimed that the government “treated them differently than oth232
er similarly-situated applicants.”
In theory, such unfair treatment
could exist even if the government’s unfairness did not massively re226

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
See supra Part IV.B.2.
230
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (citations omitted).
231
See supra Part III.B.2.
232
Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 519 (Fed. Cl. 2009).

LEWYN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

636

6/1/2010 7:17 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:597

duce the plaintiff’s property values. But in that a situation, the court
could follow Resource Investments and do what the Court of Federal
Claims did: treat the defendant’s unfair burden as part of the “public
interest” discussion, because a government action that is preposterously overinclusive or underinclusive is obviously not going to be
particularly effective in promoting the public interest.
For example, suppose a real estate developer claims that the
government allows development firms with brown-haired executives
to fill in wetlands, but denies similar permits to firms with blackhaired executives. Such an arbitrary regulatory scheme is unlikely to
be an effective means of protecting wetlands.
A regulation that singles out a small number of property owners
for excessive regulation is likely to create great economic harm to
those property owners, which supports finding liability under the
“economic harm” prong of Penn Central. Such a regulation may also
be so inordinately underinclusive or overinclusive that it might not be
truly effective in promoting the public interest, which supports finding liability under the “character” prong of Penn Central. Thus, a
“public interest/private harm” balancing test does not preclude consideration of whether a landowner has been unfairly burdened by
regulation.
In sum, courts’ “character” factor analysis should proceed as follows:
(1) If a regulation amounts to a physical invasion, then the “character” factor most likely supports a taking.
(2) Otherwise, courts should focus on the public interest at
stake—not just whether the government has a legitimate purpose for
its conduct, but the extent to which the specific regulation effectively
promotes that purpose. The government will want to show that its actions created a high level of public benefit and/or prevented a significant public harm. By contrast, a takings plaintiff will want to show
that the regulation produces minimal benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Penn Central, courts must resolve regulatory takings actions by weighing the economic impact the regulation imposes on the
claimant, the regulation’s interference with the claimant’s investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government ac233
tion. Before Lingle, many courts considered the weight of the gov233

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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ernment purpose supporting regulation and the regulation’s usefulness in achieving that purpose under the “character” prong of Penn
Central.
The Lingle Court stated that in evaluating the “character” factor,
courts should focus on whether governmental action “amounts to a
physical invasion” or “adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic
234
life to promote the common good.”
Thus, it appears that when
government action involves a physical invasion, the “character” factor
clearly favors a takings claimant. But the Court’s reference to government regulation that “promote[s] the common good” suggests
that courts should also continue to consider the extent to which the
challenged program in fact supports the common good.
Numerous post-Lingle courts and commentators assert that Lingle
either eliminates the “character” factor or requires that it be reinterpreted to focus on the extent to which government has unfairly burdened a takings plaintiff. But, given the language quoted above,
there is no reason to believe that Lingle mandates such results. Nor is
there any reason to believe that these alternative frameworks would
make Takings Clause litigation less confusing. Accordingly, courts
should continue to follow pre-Lingle precedent holding that the “character” factor includes the public interest supporting the government
action at issue.

234

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (citation omitted).

